April 23, 2009
I was recently asked to make a guest appearance on a podcast related to information security in “the cloud”. One of the participants brought up an interesting anecdote from one of his clients. Apparently the IT group at this company had been approached by a member of their marketing team who was looking for some compute resources to tackle a big data crunching exercise. The IT group responded that they were already overloaded and it would be months before they could get around to providing the necessary infrastructure. Rebuffed but undeterred, the marketing person used their credit card to purchase sufficient resources from Amazon’s EC2 to process the data set and got the work done literally overnight for a capital cost of approximately $1800.
There ensued the predictable horrified gasping from us InfoSec types on the podcast. Nothing is more terrifying than skunkworks IT, especially on infrastructure not under our direct control. “Didn’t they realize how insecure it was to do that?” “What will happen when all of our users realize how easily and conveniently they can do this?” “How can an organization control this type of risky behavior?” We went to bed immersed in our own paranoid but comfortable world-view.
Since then, however, I’ve had the chance to talk with other people about this situation. In particular, my friend John Sechrest delivered an intellectual “boot to the head” that’s caused me to consider the situation in a new light. Apparently getting the data processed in a timely fashion was so critical to the marketing department that they figured out their own self-service plan for obtaining the IT resources they needed. If the project was that critical, John asked, was it reasonable from a business perspective for the IT group to effectively refuse to help their marketing department crunch this data?
Maybe the IT group really was overloaded– most of them are these days. However, the business of the company still needs to move forward, and the clever problem-solving monkeys in various parts of the organization will figure out ways to get their jobs done even without IT support. “Didn’t they realize how insecure it was to do that?” No, and they didn’t care. They needed to accomplish a goal, and they did.
“What will happen when all of our users realize how easily and conveniently they can do this?” My guess is they’re going to start doing it a lot more. Maybe that’s a good thing. If the IT group is really overloaded, then perhaps it should think about actually empowering their users to do these kind of “one off” or prototype projects on their own without draining the resources of the core IT group. Remember that if you let a thousand IT projects bloom, 999 of them are going to wither and die shortly thereafter. Perhaps IT doesn’t need to waste time managing the death of the 999.
“How can an organization control this type of risky behavior?” You probably can’t. So perhaps your IT group should provide a secure offering that’s so compelling that your users will want to use your version rather than the commodity offerings that are so readily available. This solution will have to be tailored to each company, but I think it starts with things like:
- Pre-configured images with known baseline configurations and relevant tools so that groups can get up an running quickly without having to build and upload their own images.
- Easy toolkits for migrating data and out of these images in a secure fashion, with some sort of DLP solution baked in.
- Secure back-end storage to protect the data at rest in these images with no extra work on the part of the users.
- Integration with the organization’s existing identity management and/or AAA framework so that users don’t have to re-implement their own solutions.
- Integration with the organization’s auditing and logging infrastructures so you know what’s going on.
Putting together the kind of framework described above is a major IT project, and will require input and participation from your user community. But once accomplished, it could provide massive leverage to overtaxed IT organizations. Rather than IT having to engineer everything themselves, they provide secure self-service building blocks to their customers and let them have at it.
Providing architecture support and guidance in the early stages of each project is probably prudent. After all, the one hardy little flower that blooms and refuses to die may become a critical resource to the organization that may eventually need to be moved back “in house”. While the fact that the building blocks that were used to create the service are already well-integrated with the organization’s centralized IT infrastructure will help, having a reasonable architectural design from the start will also be a huge help when it comes time to migrate and continue scaling the service.
Am I advocating skunkworks IT? No, I like to think I’m advocating self-service IT on a grand scale. You’ll see what skunkworks IT looks like if you ignore this issue and just let your users develop their own solutions because you’re too busy to help them.
March 23, 2009
Some months ago, a fellow Information Security professional posted to one of the mailing lists I monitor, looking for security arguments to refute the latest skunkworks project from her sales department. Essentially, one of the sales folks had developed a thick client application that connected to an internal customer database. The plan was to equip all of the sales agents in the field with this application and allow them to connect directly back through the corporate firewall to the production copy of the database over an unencrypted link. This seemed like a terrible idea, and the poster was looking to marshal arguments against deploying this software.
The predictable discussion ensued, with everybody on the list enumerating the many reasons why this was a bad idea from an InfoSec perspective and in some cases suggesting work-arounds to spackle over deficiencies in the design of the system. My advice was simpler– refute the design on Engineering principles rather than InfoSec grounds. Specifically:
- The system had no provision for allowing the users to work off-line or when the corporate database was unavailable.
- While the system worked fine in the corporate LAN environment, bandwidth and latency issues over the Internet would probably render the application unusable.
Sure enough, when confronted with these reasonable engineering arguments, the project was scrapped as unworkable. The Information Security group didn’t need to waste any of their precious political capital shooting down this obviously bad idea.
This episode ties into a motto I’ve developed during my career: “Never sell security as security.” In general, Information Security only gets a limited number of trump cards they can play to control the architecture and deployment of all the IT-related projects in the pipeline. So anything they can do to create IT harmony and information security without exhausting their hand is a benefit.
It’s also useful to consider my motto when trying to get funding for Information Security related projects. It’s been my experience that many companies will only invest in Information Security a limited number of times: “We spent $35K on a new firewall to keep the nasty hackers at bay and that’s all you get.” To achieve the comprehensive security architecture you need to keep your organization safe, you need to get creative about aligning security procurement with other business initiatives.
For example, file integrity assessment tools like Tripwire have an obvious forensic benefit when a security incident occurs, but the up-front cost of acquiring, deploying, and using these tools just for the occasional forensic benefit often makes them a non-starter for organizations. However, if you change the game and point out that the primary ongoing benefit of these tools is as a control on your own change management processes, then they become something that the organization is willing to pay for. You’ll notice that the nice folks at Tripwire realized this long ago and sell their software as “Configuration Control”, not “Security”.
Sometimes you can get organizational support from even further afield. I once sold an organization on using sudo with the blessings of Human Resources because it streamlined their employee termination processes: nobody knew the root passwords, so the passwords didn’t need to get changed every time somebody from IT left the company. When we ran the numbers, this turned out to be a significant cost-savings for the company.
So be creative and don’t go into every project with your Information Security blinders on. There are lots of projects in the pipeline that may be bad ideas from an Information Security perspective, but it’s likely that they have other problems as well. You can use those problems as leverage to implement architectures that are more efficient and rational from an Engineering as well as from an Information Security perspective. Similarly there are critical business processes that the Information Security group can leverage to implement necessary security controls without necessarily spending Information Security’s capital (or political) budget.
February 17, 2009
Ed Skoudis and Mike Poor were kind enough to invite me to sit in on their recent SANS webcast round-table about emerging security threats. During the webcast I was discussing some emerging attack trends against the Linux kernel, which I thought I would also jot down here for those of you who don’t have time to sit down and listen to the webcast recording.
Over the last several months, I’ve been observing a noticable uptick in the number of denial-of-service (DoS) conditions reported in the Linux kernel. What that says to me is that there are groups out there who are scrutinizing the Linux kernel source code looking for vulnerabilities. Frankly, I doubt they’re after DoS attacks– it’s much more interesting to find an exploit that gives you control of computing resources rather than one that lets you take them away from other people.
Usually when people go looking for vulnerabilities in an OS kernel they’re looking for privilege escalation attacks. The kernel is often the easiest way to get elevated priviliges on the system. Indeed, in the past few weeks there have been a couple   of fixes for local privilege escalation vulnerabilities checked into the Linux kernel code. So not only are these types of vulnerabilities being sought after, they’re being found (and probably used).
Now “local privilege escalation” means that the attacker has already found their way into the system as an unprivileged user. Which begs the question, how are the attackers achieving their first goal of unprivileged access? Well certainly there are enough insecure web apps running on Linux systems for attackers to have a field day. But as I was pondering possible attack vectors, I had an uglier thought.
A lot of the public Cloud Computing providers make virtualized Linux images available to their customers. The Cloud providers have to allow essentially unlimited open access to their services to anybody who wants it– this is, after all, their entire business model. So in this scenario, the attacker doesn’t need an exploit to get unprivileged access to a Unix system: they get it as part of the Terms of Service.
What worries me is attackers that pair their local privilege escalation exploits with some sort of “virtualization escape” exploit, allowing them hypervisor level access to the Cloud provider’s infrastructure. That’s a nightmare scenario, because now the attacker potentially has access to other customers’ jobs running in that computing infrastructure in a way that will likely be largely undetectable by those customers.
Now please don’t mistake me. As far as we know, this scenario has not occurred. Furthermore, I’m willing to believe that the Cloud providers supply generally higher levels of security than many of their customers could do on their own (the Cloud providers having the resources to get the “pick of the litter” when it comes to security expertise). At the same time, the scenario I paint above has got to be an attractive one for attackers, and it’s possible we’re seeing the precursor traces of an effort to mount such an attack in the future.
So to all of you playing around in the Clouds I say, “Watch the skies!”